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CASE NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - TORTS BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD - RIGHT
OF AN UNEMANCIPATED CHILD To REcovER FROM ITS PARENT FOR PER-
SONAL INJURIES. The plaintiff, a thirteen year old boy, was injured
when the automobile in which he was riding, operated by his mother,
collided with another car. Acting by his next friend, the boy sued his
mother for damages alleging his injury was caused by the negligence of
his mother. It was stipulated that his mother had liability insurance in a
sum equal to recovery sought. The lower court denied a motion by the
defendant to dismiss the complaint. On appeal it was held that the motion
to dismiss should have been granted. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677
(1948).
It has been generally held that an emancipated child may sue its parent
for a tort. Cafaro v. Cafaro, 116 N.J.L. 487, 184 A. 779 (1936) ; Detwiler
v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super 383, 57 A. 2d 426 (1948); Taubert v. Taubert, '
103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908). The question of whether an infant
is emancipated is usually a question of fact. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 4 N.J.
Misc. 711, 134 A. 184 (1926) ; Martin v. Martin, 11 N.J. Misc. 705, 167 A.
227 (1933); Stiliga v. Metropolitan Cae. Ins. Co. of N. J., 113 N.J.L. 101,
172 A. 793 (1934); Detwiler v. Detwiler, supra. Where there was no
emancipation of the child, however, a different result has been reached.
Mewlitte v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). In the Hewlitte Case
a minor child brought an action against her mother for false imprison-
ment for maliciously confining the child to an insane asylum. In reversing.
a judgment for the child the court held that ". .. the peace of society,
and of the families composing the society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society,
forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. . . ." There does not appear to be any actual precedent at common
law in support of this case. Eversley, Domestic Relations (4th Ed. 1926)
571.
At common law a child could maintain an action against his father,
not only in respect to dealing with the child's property, but in an action
for libel and slander and for wrongs inflicted by him. Torts Between Per-
sons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harward Law Review 1030, 1056; Eversley,
Domest2 -  Relations (4th Ed. 1926). Since the Hewlitte Case, supra, the
rule forbidding recovery has become a well settled principle of law. Belle-
son v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932) ; Kloppenburg v. Klop-
penburg, 66 S. D. 167, 280 N.W. 206 (1938); Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn.
515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931). Only a few courts hold to the contrary.
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
See also The Suit by the Unemuncipated Child Against His Parent, 26
Georgetown Law Journal 139. The earlier cases were decided on the
theory of public policy, that to allow such suits would be harmful to the
family relationship and tranquility. Later, in cases where liability insur-
ance was involved an attempt was made to overthrow this public policy.
In the case of Detwiler v. Detwiler, supra, the defendant had liability
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insurance. There the court held that the argument that "... the rule of
public policy does not fit the present day in case of negligent operation
of an automobile by a minor protected by casualty insurance, is of no
validity." To support its argument the court cites a quotation from an
earlier case in Pennsylvania, Silverstein v. Kastner, et aL, 342 Pa. 207,
20 A. 2d 205 (1941), in which the court said, "Without a legislative man-
date, we see no justification for making such discrimination, thus segre-
gating automobile cases from other actions by a parent growing out of a
negligent conduct of an unemancipated minor because in many automobile
cases insurance might be carried that would give protection. The fact,
therefore, that there was insurance in the instant case, was of no mo-
ment." In the Villeret Case, supra. the court says the existence of liability
insurance ought not to create a cause of action where none exists other-
wise. Liability policy protects against claims legally asserted, but does not
itself produce liability. This is the theory upon which many courts base
their decisions that a child cannot sue the parent even where insurance
is involved. Luster v. Luster, 299 lass. 480, 13 N.E. 2d 488 (1938);
Lund v. Olson, supra; Norfold S. R. Co. v. Grelkis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E.
841 (1934) ; Laserki v. Kabara, et al., 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
There are no reported cases in North Dakota on this question. By
adopting a rule that such actions between a child and a parent would lie
where there was insurance, one of the elements to be proved by the plain-
tiff would be that the defendant has insurance. There would then exist a
situation where the fact of the defendant having insurance would be an
element to be proved, yet the rule in trial practice in North Dakota seems
to be that insurance shall not be mentioned in a trial of negligence cases
where such mention would be prejudicial. Ramage v. Trepanier, 69 N. D.
19, 283 N.W. 471 (1939). Since the rule of trial practice appears to be
well established in North Dakota, it would seem to follow, therefore, that
North Dakota will go along with the cases that have held that the mere
fact that the defendant-parent has insurance does not give the child the
right to recover from the parent.
BEaT L. WILSON, JR.
Third Year Law Student.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw - APPLI-
CATION IN THE TAX FIEw. The P seeks to punish for contempt and to
enjoin the unlawful practice of the law by Bercu, an accountant. C com-
pany's liability to the city of New York for retail sales taxes and com-
pensating use taxes accrued in 1936, 1937, and 1938, during which time
C had no taxable profits and the claims were not paid. In 1943 C made
large profits and deemed it desirable to settle these tax claims with the
city of New York if a deduction could be taken for the payment on the
federal income tax return for 1943. C employed its own accountant-
lawyer and his opinion was that the deductions could not be made for the
current year, but could be taken only in the years in which they accrued-
1936, 1937, and 1938. Upon being consulted by C concerning the matter,
the D stated that as an accountant he would say the deduction could not
be taken for 1943, but he was sure there was a case holding otherwise
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
and that he would make his own research on the subject The D found a
treasury decision supporting the position which C wished to take. D sub-
mitted his findings to C and received compensation for his services. He
did not file the income tax return for C. The Special Term held that D's
activities lay within the proper scope of the accounting profession and
therefore did not constitute the unlawful practice of law. On appeal it
was held that the decision be reversed. The injunction was issued, and D
fined for contempt. New York County Lawyer Association v. Bercu, 273
App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S. 2nd 209 (1948).
With many lawyers today, problems of taxation make up a substantial
part of their practice. The above stated case makes an attempt to deter-
mine what phases of taxation must be left to the exclusive jurisdiction
of members of the bar. In determining the matter of accountants un-
authorized encroachment upon the legal profession in the tax field the
general rules laid down by the courts as to what constitutes the practice
of law are applied.
The practice of law is not limited to the preparation of cases and their
conduct in court. It includes legal advice and counsel and the drawing of
instruments, when such instruments set forth, limit, terminate, claim, or
grant legal rights. Cain v. Merchants National Bank and Trust Co. of
Fargo, 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936). The drafting of documents,
when merely incidental to the work of a distinct occupation, is not the
practice of law, although the documents have legal consequences. People
v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919).
A layman may prepare simple elementary documents of a routine charac-
ter and may also advise persons as to matters involved, without engaging
in the prohibited practice of law where the legal training, knowledge, and
skill required are not beyond the range of an average man. State v. Childe,
139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941). A person who is not a member of the
bar may draw simple legal instruments when they are incidental to
transactions in which such person is interested provided no charge is made
therefor. If compensation is exacted, either directly or indirectly, ail
advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law constitutes practicing law. Cain v. Merchants National Bank and
Trust Co. of Fargo, supra. However, in People v. Jersin, 74 Pac. 2d 668
(Colo. 1937), the court said that special consideration should be given in
cases of emergency when lawyers were unavailable and that the matter
of compnsation is not determinative of the issue. A sharp line cannot be
drawn between the field of the lawyer and that of the accountant, but any
service that lies wholly within the practice of law cannot lawfully be
performed by an accountant or any other person not a member of the bar.
Meniick v. American Security and Trust'Company, 107 F. 2d 271 (1940).
Taxation which invades almost every phase of modern life is so inter-
woven with nearly every branch of law that one could hardly pick any tax
problem and say this is a question of pure taxation or pure tax law wholly
unconnected with other legal principles. "How any accountant doing
income tax work could do his business at all without a knowledge of the
statutes, decisions, and treasury rulings in income tax matters is hard to
see and we should hesitate to hold the necessity of such knowledge would
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require every member of a firm of accountants to be a member of the bar."
Hutmphreys v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. 2d 430 (1937).
Tax accounting problems are questions of fact not of law. Dobson v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). The making out of a
simple tax return is not practicing law. Lowell Bar Association, et al.,
v. Loeb et at., 52 N.E. 2d 27 (Mass. 1943). In the main case the court said
that as a matter of practical administration, while allowing the accountant
jurisdiction of incidental questions of law which may arise in connection
with auditing books or preparing tax returns, they should be denied the
right as a consultant to give legal advice. Though the same legal question
may arise in preparing a tax return and at another time serve as the sub-
ject of a request for advice by a client, the difference is that in the former
the accountant is dealing with a question of law which is only incidental to
preparing a tax return and in the latter he is addressing himself to the
question of law alone. An accountant must be restrained when he under-
takes to-pass upon a legal question apart from the regular pursuit of his
calling though he may understand the legal question involved. Auerbacker
et al. v. Wood, 142 N.J.Eq. 484, 59 A. 2d 863 (1948). The justification
for excluding from the practice of law persons not admitted to the bar
is to be found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by incompetent and unreliable persons, over whom the Judicial
Department could exercise little control. Lowell Bar Association et al. v.
Loeb et al., eupra, In dealing with the controversy in the future there
are two alternative methods which could be pursued. With the gen-
eral basis now laid down by the courts as to what constitutes the prac-
tice of law in the field of taxation, each individual case could be
settled through a lawsuit as it arises. It would seem, however, that such
jurisdictional fights are beneath the dignity of both the legal and account-
ing professions and should be avoided as much as possible. The other
possible solution is for members of both professions to reach an agree-
ment outside of the courts as to the work to be done by each. Some pro-
ress has been made along this line as in 1944, the National Conference of
Lawyers and CPA's was created. As is stated by Louis S. Golderg, CPA
and member of the Iowa bar, "The line between the two professions is
often imperceptible ... and frequently rules of law and rules of accounting
are indistinguishable. In the area where distinction is possible, the boun-
dary can be marked by conference better than by court." Journal of
Accounting, p. 188 (Sept. 1947). A better relationship between both ac-
countants and lawyers should be sought as to the contribution which each
of the professions is equipped to make in the public interest.
MELVIN M. CHRISTIANSON
Third Year Law Student.
JOINT TENANCY - BANK ACCOUNTS - RIGHT OF SURVIVOR WHO HAS
MADE No CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEPOSIT. A opened a joint bank account
in two banks in his own name and that of D. After A's death, D claimed
the balances remaining in both accounts by the right of survivorship.
A's executor brought suit to recover said monies and prevailed in the trial
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court. On appeal it was held that the judgment be affirmed. The court
held that the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of
testimony of uninterested witnesses as to conversations with A previous
to his making the accounts, as such testimony was admissible to indicate
A's intention in creating such accounts and the evidence sustained a find-
ing by the trial court that the accounts were created by A as a matter of
convenience only. No attempt was made to sustain D's right to the bal-
ance of the accounts on the basis of a gift inter vivos. Pence v. Wessels,
320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W. 2d 834 (1945). The court pointed out in this case,
that a statute creating a presumption of joint tenancy where accounts are
in the names of two or more persons, payable to either, does not create a
conclusive presumption.
Where the parties indicate an intention to create a gift inter vivos by
means of a written instrument, the instrument being conclusive of the
deceased's intention to create a joint ownership, the right of survivor-
-hip follows as f legal incident. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 169 Cal. 287, 146 P.
647 (1915). Where there is no written instrument upon which to base
such a conclusion, a different problem arises. As pointed out by Justice
Nuessle in First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Green, 66 N.D. 160, 262
N.W. 596 (1935), "There is a great diversity of holding in the cases
respecting the rights of parties in whose names joint deposits in savings
and other banks are made. This is particularly so as respects the rights
of parties who contribute none of the money constituting the deposit
where the other party who does contribute dies. Some of the cases have
held such deposits effective or ineffective as the case may be to constitute
gifts causa mortis, gifts inter vivos, or as creating trusts, some have held
them to constitute voluntary bestowments in joint tenancy, some to be
merely abortive attempts at testamentary disposition, and some to be
contractual arrangements for the convenience of the depositor without
benefit to the other party." In many instances the right of the survivor,
who has made no contribution to the deposit, turns on the question of
whether or not a gift inter vivos was in fact created. In Battles v. Mil-
bury iavings Bank, 250 Mass. 180, 145 N.E. 55 (1924), the court stated
that where the right of the survivor to the deposit, created in the names
of two or more, is based on a gift inter vivos, the elements of a gift must
be present. If they do exist, a joint account would be held to operate as a
present and complete gift in joint ownership, if such was the intention
of the -4epositor. The following cases point out instances where the
intention to create a gift inter vivos to the survivor was not clearly indi-
cated and therefore no interest passed to the survivor upon the death of
the depositor. In the case of Bradford v. Eastman, 299 Mass. 499, 118
N.E. 879 (1918), it was held that where the owner of bank deposits
caused the same to be put in the names of herself and her niece, and gave
possession of the deposit books to the niece on the latter's promise to
return them, there being no intention to make a gift, as between the
owner and her niece the money belonged always and wholly to the former.
The case of McGillivray v. First National Bank of Dickinson, 56 N.D.
152, 217 N.W. 150 (1927) points out that an estate in joint tenancy, in a
credit resulting from a bank deposit, is not created by inserting donee's
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name in a certificate of deposit as a joint payee where full control of the
certificate and of the deposit are retained by the depositor. Accord: Den-
igan v. San Francisco Saving Union, et al., 127 Cal. 142, 59 P. 390 (1899).
The question arises as to what will be sufficient to create a bank account
in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in North Dakota. The
N. D. Rev. Code (1943), Sec. 47-0206 provides that, "A joint interest is
one owned by several persons in equal shares by a title created by a single
will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a
joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as
joint tenants." Sec. 47-0208 provides that, "Every interest created in
favor of several persons in their own right is an interest in common
unless acquired by them in partnership for partnership purposes, or
unless declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy." By Sec. 6-0366,
a bank which holds money by deposit in two names may pay to either of
the named persons without liability. In Denigan v. San Francisco Saving
Union, et al., supra, the California Supreme Court, construing Sec. 683
Civ. Code, which is in substance identical with See. 47-0206 of the N. D.
Rev. Code (1943), said in part that, "The proposition of respondent that
this section applies only to real estate is without support. There is no
limitation of this character in this section, and, as it is found in the title
headed 'Ownership' and the chapter thereof which treats 'Interests in
Property' irrespective of its character, it must be held applicable to all
kinds of property." In Armstrong v. Hellwig, 70 S.D. 406, 18 N.W. 2d
284 (1945), the court held that SDC Sec. 51-0214, similar to Sec. 47-
0208 of the N. D. Rev. Code (1943), which requires that every interest
in favor of several persons in their own right in property is an interest
in common unless declared in its creation to be a joint interest, is
satisfied by any form of words which clearly express intention to create
a joint tenancy, and it is not necessary in order to create a joint tenancy
t expressly call it that. The court further held that a single conveyance
of realty, expressly declaring that the conveyance was to the grantees and
survivor of them in his or her own right, created a joint tenancy. A con-
veyance to "husband and wife" as "joint tenants" was held to be sufficient
to create an estate in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, in
Englebrecht v. Englebrecht, et aL, 323 Ill. 208, 153 N.E. 827 (1926).
Because the North Dakota statutes are similar to those in California
and South Dakota, it would seem to follow that our statutes would apply
to personalty as well as realty, and also that the statute is satisfied by
any form of words which clearly express intention to create a joint tenan-
cy. If that is so, then it would also seem to follow that a joint tenancy
in a bank account, in North Dakota, could he created by a sole contribu-
tor, by using the words "in joint tenancy" or similar words, with or
without a statement that such deposit was not to be considered as an
interest in common. However, a deposit set up in such a way would prob-
ably not raise a conclusive presumption that a joint tenancy exists, but
could probably be upset by the heirs of the contributor, if they could show
that the contributor did not intend to create a joint tenancy in the bank
account. In such a situation, no doubt the fact that the contributor in
setting up the deposit used the correct words, would be strong evidence
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of his intent to create a joint tenancy. It is believed, however, that no
conclusive presumption of joint tenancy is created by complying with
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0208.
ARNOLD 0. GINNOW
Third Year Law Student.
SALES - FLOOR PLAN CHATTEL MORTGAGES - PROTECTION OF BONA
FIDE PURCHASERS. Plaintiffs purchased two automobiles from defendant-
dealer, which, unknown to them, were subject to prior, properly filed,
"floor plan" chattel mortgages held by defendant Contract Purchase
Corporation. The mortgagor-dealer was left in possession of the auto-
mobiles, being allowed to place them in stock and sell to customers in the
regular course of business. The mortgagor was also permitted to give
such purchasers certificates of title to the automobiles without disclosing
the liens, thus leaving it to the mortgagor-dealer to thereafter pay the
mortgages and obtain releases therefrom. Upon the dealer defaulting
in payments to the mortgagee, the cars were seized by the finance com-
pany while in the possession of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought an action
for their return and from an adverse decision the finance company
appealed. On appeal it was held that the judgment be affirmed. The court
pointed out that the question involved goes beyond the mere issue of
whether plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers or not and, that through its
course of dealings the finance company had put it in the power of the
dealer to mislead purchasers and perpetuate a fraud, which under the
circumstances, estopped them from enforcing their lien. Daas v. Contract
Purchase Corporation, et al., 318 Mich. 348, 28 N.W. 2d 226 (1947).
Under common law, a chattel mortgage on personal property was void
unless possessiQn of said property was retained by the mortgagee, it being
decided early that one of the badges of fraud was the retention of posses-
sion by the transferor. Twynes Case, 76 Eng. Reprint 809 (1602). For a
substantial incorporation of this common law doctrine see N. D. Rev.
Code (1943) Sec. 13-0106. The applicable Michigan statute relied on in
the instant case is similar to our own N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 35-
0406, which provides that a mortgage of personal property is void as
against creditors and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the
property in good faith for value, unless the mortgage is filed in the office
of the register of deeds. In America, generally, and as interpreted in
Richert ". Simons, 6 N.D. 239, 42 N.W. 657 (1889), the fling of a chattel
mortgage properly executed and regular on its face, is equivalent to
actual delivery and change of possession. For other statutory construc-
tions see Pace v. Threewit, 31 Cal. App. 2d 509, 88 Pac. 2d 247 (1939)
(Double purpose of giving notice to interested parties and enabling them
to identify and locate their property); Stamler v. Universal Ins. Co., 305
Mich. 131, 9 N.W. 2d 33 (1943) (Notice for purposes declared by statute
only); Nome State Bank v. Brendmoen, 70 N.D. 391, 295 N.W. 82 (1940).
In some jurisdictions, such as Texas and California, Certificates of Title
Acts have repealed prior statutes relating to chattel mortgages insofar as
they relate to the recording of motor vehicles thereunder. Motor Inv. Co.
v. City of Hamlin, 142 Tex. 486, 179 S.W. 2d 278 (1944); In re Wiegand,
140
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27 F. Supp. 725 (Cal. 1939). Thus while the generally accepted rule that
one cannot convey more than he has, 1 WiUiston Sales (2d Ed.) sec. 314
p. 719, sec. 315 p. 721; Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N.D. 1059, 194 N.W. 824
(1923) does not present too many conflicting ramifications, the problem
becomes more complex where recordation and subsequent rights of inno-
cent third parties may become involved. Where it appears either on the
face of a chattel mortgage or by parol evidence that the mortgagee has
given the mortgagor powers of control, retention and disposition as he
sees fit, the problem becomes further accentuated by the diversity of
authorities in the United States as to whether the mortgage is void, void-
able, or merely presents a factual situation which may or may not estop
enforcement of the mortgagee's lien. Michigan, as evidenced by the
instant case in which the court rendered a unanimous decision, has
unwaveringly held that the validity of the mortgage is a question of fact
to be determined on the intent of the parties in the light of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding and attendant upon the transaction. In a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, In re Kramer Mercantile Co., 21 F. 2d 615 (Okla.
1927) it was held that retention of possession by the mortgagor does not
of itself raise a presumption of fraud but is only a factor to be con-
sidered along with the other attendant facts and circumstances in deter-
mining whether there has been fraud in fact. In Farmers National Bank
v. Missouri Livestock Commission, 53 F. 2d 991 (Mo. 1931) where a lien
was claimed by virtue of a chattel mortgage on cattle, the court held that
a waiver had been spelled out by the mortgagee giving the mortgagor
consent to sell the livestock. It was further held that this would be so
regardless of the purchaser's knowledge or lack of knowledge of the
previous lien and that the waiver may be shown by express words or by
implication from a course of conduct. The court in Howell v. Board, 185
Okla. 513, 94 P. 2d 830 (1939) held that the mortgagee's knowledge that
the mortgagor would sell in the usual course of business rendered the lien
ineffective notwithstanding recording. Accord: Rogers County Bank v.
Cullison, 186 Okla. 373, 98 P. 2d 612 (1940). South Dakota has held that
such a transaction (where mortgagee allows the mortgagor to remain in
possession and dispose of the goods as if they were his own and unencum-
bered) raises a prima facie case of fraud which will sta-d only if unre-
butted, placing the burden on the mortgagee to show that the transaction
was made in good faith, upon proper consideration, and without intent to
hinder or delay creditors. Hellenbeck v. Louden, 35 S.D. 320, 152 N.W.
116 (1915). In Bergman v. Jones, 10 N.D. 520, 88 N.W. 284 (1901) an
insolvent partnership executed a chattel mortgage to secure a pre-
existing debt with the mortgagee allowing the mortgagor to remain in
possession and sell the encumbered merchandise in the regular course of
business. When the mortgagee subsequently brought an action for con-
version of the goods against the sheriff who had levied on them for other
creditors, the court held the mortgagee's lien void, imputing fraud as a
matter of law in obedience to the principle that the parties must have
contemplated the natural consequences of their acts.
Where the mortgagee consented to the mortgagor's sale of the still
encumbered property this was recognized as a waiver or estoppel of
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further claim for a lien substituting in its stead the personal promise
of the mortgagor (debtor) to repay the mortgagee (creditor). New Eng-
land Security Co. v. Great Western Elevator Co., 6 N.D. 407, 71 N.W. 130
(1897). But note that this result does not follow where the mortgagor
remains the agent of the mortgagee. Red River National Bank v. North
Star Boot & Shoe Co., 8 N.D. 432, 79 N.W. 130 (1897). Accord: Regional
Agr. Cr. Corp. v. Griggs County, 73 N.D. 1, 10 N.W. 2d 861 (1943) where
consent to sale was on condition that proceeds were to be received by third
party and applied on mortgage debt after payment of costs of sale.
If confronted with a factual situation such as the Daas Case, supra,
North Dakota would undoubtedly hold the mortgage fraudulent and void
as regards the bona fide purchaser without regard to the bona fides of the
debt or intentions of the parties, with the presumption of fraud attaching
when the circumstances are proved. While this may seem startling, in
view of sec. 9-0310 of the N. D. Rev. Code (1943) which provides that
actual fraud is always a matter of fact, it must be borne in mind that as
early as the Bergman Case, supra, the court considered and felt disin-
clined to follow the dictates of the legislature in this regard where the
court felt that the entire transaction smacked of fraud. The justification
of such a supposition could probably be based onthe fact that in most
cases it is but mere speculation to attempt to gather the parties' true
motives which often elude the most searching inquiries. Certainly where
a mortgagee nullifies the effect of the protection accorded him by a
recording act by his inconsistent conduct in the form of his tacit acqui-
escence in the mortgagor's indicia of ownership it is not manifestly
inequitable to hold the parties to the natural consequences of their acts.
Thus, while it is not a court's proper office to legislate, it may feel bound
to mould its decisions according to the exigencies of the factual situation
presented. Such will be the necessary action of the courts until there is
legislation which not only admits of but actually contemplates bona fide
purchasers and provides for their adequate protection in cases where
opportunity for fraud is present.
W .. TAm G. GEHmes
Third Year Law Student.
